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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






MICHAEL J. BEAUTYMAN;  




 DAVID J. LAURENT a/k/a DAVID J. LEHARVEO;  
GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA;  
AMERICAN BANKERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA 
 
      DAVID J. LAURENT a/k/a DAVID J. LEHARVEO, 
                                                                                          Appellant 
__________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-17-cv-05804) 
District Judge:  Honorable Robert F. Kelly 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 1, 2020 
Before:  SHWARTZ, RESTREPO and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 






* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 




Pro se appellant David J. Laurent appeals from the judgment entered against him 
by the District Court after a jury trial.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the 
District Court’s judgment.  
In 2017, Michael J. Beautyman and the Michael J. Beautyman Family Limited 
Partnership (hereinafter collectively referred to as “Beautyman”) filed an action in the 
Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas against Laurent, General Insurance Company of 
America (GICA), and American Bankers Insurance Company of Florida for damages to 
real and personal property stemming from the period during which Laurent rented 
Beautyman’s condominium.  The matter was removed to the District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  GICA filed a cross-claim against American Bankers 
and Laurent for contribution and/or indemnity.  In June 2018, American Bankers was 
dismissed pursuant to a stipulation of settlement between it and Beautyman; all cross-
claims by and against American Bankers were dismissed without prejudice.  The District 
Court subsequently granted GICA’s motion for summary judgment with respect to 
Beautyman’s claims; the cross-claim against Laurent remained outstanding.   
The matter proceeded to trial on the breach of contract claims against Laurent.  
After a jury verdict, judgment was entered on October 4, 2019, in favor of Beautyman in 
the amount of $135,689.68.  On October 17, 2019, Laurent filed a renewed motion for 
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judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b).  The District Court denied 
the motion in an order entered November 1, 2019, and this appeal ensued.1 
Laurent’s first two arguments relate to service of process.  He maintains that the 
District Court ran afoul of Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) when it granted Beautyman’s request for 
substituted service of process.  He also argues that the District Court lacked personal 
jurisdiction over him because Beautyman did not properly effectuate service on him. 
“Issues concerning the propriety of service under Rule 4 are subject to plenary review.”  
See McCurdy v. Am. Bd. of Plastic Surgery, 157 F.3d 191, 194 (3d Cir. 1998). 
Rule 4(m) requires a district court to dismiss a case without prejudice, or to order 
that service be made within a specified time, if the plaintiff fails to serve the defendant 
within 90 days of filing the complaint.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m).  “But if the plaintiff shows 
good cause for the failure, the court must extend the time for service for an appropriate 
period.”  Id.  Here, Beautyman filed a motion to substitute service on May 1, 2018, 125 
 
1 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  At the time the appeal was filed, 
GICA’s cross-claim against Laurent remained pending, and, therefore, the appeal was 
taken from a non-final order.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1291;  Hill v. City of Scranton, 411 F.3d 
118, 124 (3d Cir. 2005).  However, the cross-claims have since been effectively 
withdrawn, see DCD #90-1, and the appeal is now ripe for review.  See DL Res., Inc. v. 
First Energy Sols. Corp., 506 F.3d 209, 216 (3d Cir. 2007) (applying the doctrine of Cape 
May Greene, Inc. v. Warren, 698 F.2d 179, 185 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding that a notice of 
appeal filed before a final decision has been made but followed by a final appealable 
order is treated as an appeal from the final order in the absence of prejudice to the 
respondent)); see also Bethel v. McAllister Brothers, Inc., 81 F.3d 376, 382 (3d Cir. 
1996) (holding that “an otherwise non-appealable order may become final for purposes of 





days after the complaint was filed.  The District Court determined that, despite a “good 
faith effort to locate and serve” Laurent, Beautyman had not been able to do so because, 
it appeared, Laurent was “concealing his physical whereabouts” to avoid service of 
process.  District Ct. Docket (DCD) #19.  The Court granted Beautyman permission to 
make service of process to Laurent’s last known mailing and internet addresses.   
Laurent argues that the Court erred in failing to dismiss the complaint or direct 
that service be made within a specified period of time in accordance with Rule 4(m).  We 
find no reversible error.  Courts consider “three factors in determining the existence of 
good cause under Rule 4(m):  (1) reasonableness of plaintiff’s efforts to serve[;] (2) 
prejudice to the defendant by lack of timely service[;] and (3) whether plaintiff moved for 
an enlargement of time to serve.”  MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Teleconcepts, Inc., 71 F.3d 
1086, 1097 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Nuttall, 122 F.R.D. 163, 166-67) (D. 
Del. 1988)).  Laurent does not dispute that Beautyman showed a basis for good cause as 
to why he could not reasonably effectuate service.  The thrust of his argument is that 
Beautyman failed to demonstrate a reasonable basis for failing to timely move for an 
enlargement of time to serve.  See id.    
According to Laurent, Beautyman was aware of a “proper mailing address” for 
Laurent in mid-March 2017, and he “could have petitioned the court for substituted 
service at any time before the 90-day window expired.”  Appellant’s Br. at  5.  But the 
address known to Beautyman at that time was a P.O. Box.  See App. Vol. II at 298, 303; 
see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2) (noting that service may be made by delivering a copy of 
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the summons to the individual personally, or by leaving it at their dwelling or with 
authorized agent).  In any event, there is no specified time limit on a Rule 4(m) motion; 
rather, its timeliness is a factor in determining whether the motion for extension of time 
should be granted.  See McCurdy, 157 F.3d at 196-97 (affirming the denial of a Rule 
4(m) motion where the plaintiff did not seek “an extension of time before the time 
allotted under the Rules had lapsed” and until after the statute of limitations had expired) 
(emphasis in original).  Although the motion for substituted service was filed after the 90-
day period, it is clear that Beautyman made several timely attempts to serve Laurent, and 
that he sought to confirm his address for personal service through a variety of means, 
including a Freedom of Information Act request to the United States Postal Service and a 
search of court records.  This diligence, when considered with Laurent’s apparent efforts 
to evade service of process, established good cause for failing to timely serve.  Having 
determined as much, the Court was required to grant Beautyman’s motion, which was 
tantamount to a Rule 4(m) motion.  See id. at 196.   
In granting Beautyman’s motion to substitute service, the District Court impliedly 
granted an extension of time to make service of process; but it failed to technically 
comply with Rule 4(m)’s requirement that it set a specific time period for service. 
Laurent was not prejudiced by this error, however, where service was made within 16 
days of the Court’s order and there is no indication that the applicable statute of 
limitations would have barred Beautyman from refiling the complaint were it dismissed.  
Moreover, for all of the foregoing reasons, the District Court did not err in dismissing the 
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complaint under Rule 4(m) either sua sponte or, even assuming one was filed, on motion 
by Laurent.2   
Laurent next argues that the Court lacked personal jurisdiction over him because 
he was not properly served and proof of service was not established as required by Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 4(c) and (l).  Specifically, he asserts that Plaintiff’s counsel could not properly 
serve the affidavit, and that the affidavit of service was electronically signed and lacked 
the notary’s stamp and license number.  Laurent waived these personal jurisdiction 
arguments by failing to properly object to service of process on these bases in the District 
Court.  See Tri-M Grp., LLC v. Sharp, 638 F.3d 406, 416 (3d Cir. 2011) (noting that 
arguments not raised in the district court will not be considered for the first time on 
appeal); see also Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 
694, 703 (1982) (noting that personal jurisdiction can be waived).  In any event, we agree 
with Beautyman that service was made in compliance with the federal rules. 
Laurent next maintains that Beautyman thwarted his attempts to obtain discovery 
by failing to respond to requests for production of documents and interrogatories, as well 
as to a subpoena to inspect the real property at issue in the matter.  Contrary to his 
 
2 In an email to the District Court judge’s deputy clerk, Laurent indicated that he was 
“seeking the court, on its own, without a motion” to dismiss the matter for failure to 
comply with Rule 4(m).  DCD#29 & Ex. A-1.  Laurent raised the issue at the pretrial 
conference hearing (Rule 16 hearing) held in June 2018.  The District Court advised him 
to file a Rule 4(m) motion.  Instead, Laurent raised the issue as an affirmative defense in 




contention, Beautyman did not act in bad faith by filing a motion to quash Laurent’s 
discovery requests, and the District Court did not abuse its discretion in granting the 
motion, where the discovery requests were “served” more than eight months after 
discovery had closed and within a month of when trial was scheduled to start.3  See DCD 
##53, 54; see Eisai, Inc. v. Sanofi Aventis U.S., LLC, 821 F.3d 394, 402 (3d Cir. 2016) 
(noting that discovery decisions are reviewed for abuse of discretion).  We also find no 
abuse of discretion in the Court’s decision to deny Laurent’s motion to exclude evidence 
at trial which Beautyman allegedly failed to provide in discovery.  See Stecyk v. Bell 
Helicopter Textron, Inc., 295 F.3d 408, 412 (3d Cir. 2002) (review of a district court’s 
evidentiary rulings is for abuse of discretion).  The District Court credited Beautyman’s 
representation that the evidence had been produced, and Laurent provides no basis, other 
than his say-so, to suggest that the Court erred.  See DCD #64; App. Vol. II at 210-11.  
Finally, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Laurent’s motion to 
dismiss the action based on Beautyman’s alleged failure to provide a list of disclosures as 
required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1).  DCD ##59, 61.  The issue was not timely raised, 
and, regardless, we agree with Beautyman that Laurent could not show the requisite 
prejudice under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a) where he otherwise received the relevant 
information in, inter alia, copies of responses to GICA’s discovery in August 2018, and 
 
3 Beautyman maintained in the District Court that he was never properly served with 




Beautyman’s pretrial memorandum.  See Nicholas v. Pa. State Univ., 227 F.3d 133, 148 
(3d Cir. 2000). 
Finally, we find no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s decision to deny 
Laurent’s motion for a continuance.  Laurent sought the continuance to allow for 
additional time for discovery and settlement negotiations, and to secure counsel; but he 
provided absolutely no bases for granting the motion.  Moreover, the motion was filed in 
September 2019, just weeks before trial, long after discovery had ended,4 and nearly a 
year and a half after the Court advised Laurent to obtain counsel.  See App., Vol. II at 
243.  Furthermore, in an email to Beautyman’s counsel just a week prior to filing the 
motion for a continuance, Laurent acknowledged that there were no fruitful settlement 
negotiations, declaring that “the only path” he saw “to obtain immunity for [him]self and 
receive final closure . . . [wa]s to proceed to trial.”  Id. at 255.   
Based on the foregoing, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.  
 
4 At the Rule 16 hearing in June 2018, the District Court ordered discovery to be 
completed by October 2018; it subsequently granted a motion to extend the discovery 
period, by two months, until December 18, 2018. 
